Bernard Lonergan SJ and Christianity: "Proof"
Introduction
The existence of God is based on the intelligibility of the world. To follow this out we will examine the philosophy of the twentieth century Jesuit theologian Bernard Lonergan. This involves a discussion, however quickly of how we come to know something and then what that will mean. So first knowing, then God. After that we may have time for the problem of evil [basic sin] and then the solution to basic sin found in Christianity, philosophically. But let’s not set the bar too high!
I. Knowing and Lonergan’s cognitional dynamics
Lonergan asserts that knowing is a three part dynamic of cognition: knowing involves experience, understanding, and verification. To examine this theory we will take a simple example of knowledge and explore it: the law of gravity.
First, imagine you are walking through the park and notice a leaf which gets detached from a tree branch. You notice that it floats gently to the ground. This is an example of the experience component of knowledge. One experience is random and probably won’t spark your attention too much, but imagine that another leaf does the exact same thing, then another and another, etc. You might become suspicious that something is going on here. You might also notice that a cat has climbed up the tree and also becomes dislodged, falling to the ground. Inquisitive, you might also climb the tree yourself and hang on a branch, releasing your grip after a bit of debate and notice that you too, fall to the ground. All of these events are the experiential component of knowing reality; in and of themselves they are nothing but a collection of random events (seeing any one of them by itself may not spark anything in particular), but to an intelligent person the knowing process will start to hit the second stage: insight.
While in the hospital recovering from your own event you might try to ‘understand’ what was going on in all those events. You have a keen sense that the world is intelligible, that things make sense and so try to understand what could possibly connect these different, yet similar, events. Then you get an insight, a
The final step in knowing is judgment, answering the simple question: ‘Is it true?’ Do answer this you must investigate your insight (in science we call this a hypothesis) by checking out reality. In the case of our insight, we might want to bring some device that measures the wind so we can see if our insight is indeed correct. Of course we will find that the wind is not blowing downward, but rather that we need a better insight (one which is true) in order to make sense of the situation. In this case of course the insight is that there is a law of gravity at work, whatever might be meant by that can be worked out by physicists. With this insight of the law of gravity we can now test it out and confirm that our grasp of reality is indeed true of the world: there is such a thing as gravity by which all objects are naturally directed towards the earth while falling.
The most important part is to realize that all three steps are necessary in coming to true knowledge. To be specific, we have come to what Lonergan calls the virtually unconditioned. This means that after reflection on our insight into experience we have answered all the questions we can ask adequately and so the fact is unconditioned. For finite minds however, it is virtually unconditioned because we must be open to the possibility of revision, as in science theories, without eliminating the truths which we have discovered.
As an example of this we can think of Newtonian physics and Einsteinian physics; it is not that
Why is this three step process important, even essential? Because it is the grounding of all reality, and it is personal. First it is the grounding of all reality because knowing is correspondent to the known; we can only speak of the known world in so much as we can know the world. To speak of something means to know it, even if our known is what Lonergan would call a ‘known unknown’: we know there is something which we do not yet know. This is what spurs on a particular insight. In a sense the primary insight into the world is that there are known unknowns for this drives us to know them and allows us to believe that they (and the world itself) are knowable. We are confirmed in these ‘known unknowns’ because they quickly (usually) become ‘known knowns’ through the process of knowledge and cognition just discussed.
The second reason why this is important is that it makes all knowledge dependent on rational self-consciousness. To be known, to be true, there must be more than a concept floating in mid-air (the second step of the process, insight) but there must be a reflection made by a rational agent. For something to be true it must be known to be true, otherwise it just is as a collection of occurrences. The law of gravity is true because it has passed the reflection stage in verification; the law of downward blowing wind is not true because it hasn’t. Until there is rational judgment neither one nor the other can be called true. This may seem startling but it is a necessary fact given our cognitional dynamic.
So this lengthy excursus on epistemology (the study of knowing) is important because knowing is intimately and crucially linked to the known; reality is known by experience, understanding and reflection. In this sense, the notion of being, the definition of reality is that which is known by the questions asked and affirmed through the third stage of knowledge, rational reflection.
II. Existence of God
Okay, time to get to the real deal, the ‘proof of God.’ What I want to do here is discuss two preliminaries, two premises, and then one syllogism which the proof will consist of. So two preliminaries:
1. What kind of proof?
What kind of proof will this be? Well, it can be either a priori or a posteriori. The first is from causes to effects, the second is from effects to causes. The first would be the ontological argument (The necessary being exists necessarily), but this is an only a concept and does not move to existence in the three part process of knowing. So this must be an a posteriori proof. We have already seen how this works in our insight into the law of gravity. No one can find an existent thing which is gravity, but we know it exists from its effects, i.e. falling leaves, cats, and people. The insight and knowledge of God will consist in the same sort of argument, moving from some effects to a cause, moving from accidents to substance, in a sense.
2. Extrinsic Causality
The second preliminary which is important is the existence of something called ‘extrinsic causality’. This means a cause which is either efficient or final in the traditional set; or for our terms, a cause which is connected with the object but not intrinsic to it. Science (say physics) is concerned with internal causes as such, but metaphysics (or higher science) is concerned with higher causes, extrinsic causes.
This need not be abstract. For example, in building a bridge extrinsic causality is involved in the form of efficient and final causality. The final cause is the use of the bridge (what it is being built for) and the efficient causality is the men building it, external agents cause the bridge to be formed. Physics and chemistry (maybe biology) can deal with the material causality of the bridge (tensile strength, chemical composition) but there are certainly other extrinsic causes which make the bridge a bridge; examining the physical composition won’t tell you why this bridge exists in this place now.
So extrinsic causality is valid in specific cases, but since we are concerned with all reality, all being, which is what we are asking questions about, this extrinsic causality must also be valid for general or universal cases. This is obviously apparent since the bridge is a specific example of our general observation of extrinsic causality.
Note: We shouldn’t run to fast ahead here, we haven’t proved anything yet, far from it! If we want to have knowledge of God’s existence it must be done rigorously; right now were are just preparing the ground as it were and getting some definitions straight. In themselves they tell us nothing, they are rather the empirical residue as it were of a later insight and judgment which will end up with the affirmation of the statement ‘God exists’. But let’s not move too quickly!
Now that the two preliminaries are finished, let’s move to our two premises, which follow naturally from everything else we have been saying.
1. Being is intelligible
Lonergan says: “Because being is intelligible: it is what is to be known by correct understanding; by definition, it is the intelligible. Being has to be the intelligible to be what is to be known by correct understanding, because the intelligible is all that correct understanding knows.”
What this means is that being (all that is the objective of the pure desire to know, the correct answers to all our questions) must be the intelligible, the order. This means that nothing is ultimately random in being; it may appear random on some levels (subatomic processes) but when moving to a higher viewpoint (statistical laws; chemistry) then it has a reason. This reason is essential because to be known is to be understood and judged correct (steps two and three of knowledge) but randomness can ultimately not be judged correct because it can not be understood. So being (all that is) must be intelligible, able to be known through correct understanding.
2. Defects in intelligibility
But we know that we don’t know everything. We know a lot, but we can’t answer all questions when we move to higher viewpoints. Lonergan says: “You can explain it provisionally by saying this is because that is. But why is that?”
This is relevant to the pure and unrestricted desire to know in all of us: there are always more questions to ask than answers. In other words, each answer only leads to more questions.
We have just affirmed that being is intelligible, but “why should reality be intelligible? What is the ultimate ground of its being intelligible? Our minds are not that ultimate ground.”
Our minds (the three step process of knowing) tell us that the known (being) is intelligible, but they are not the cause of its intelligibility. For example, we know the moon is spherical because of the phases we see in the sky throughout the month, but the phases of the moon are not the ontological ground of the moon’s spherical shape. “Similarly, the structure of our minds is the ground of our knowledge that the real must be being and intelligible. But there is a further question: What accounts for the fact that the real is intelligible and being?”
If being is intelligible, which we have determined it to be by our cognitive structure (the basic position) then we cannot stop asking questions at some point. “Being has to be intelligible. But the intelligible is not something with respect to which I answer a certain group of questions and, for no reason whatever, refuse to answer further questions… There is no point where you can arbitrarily say, ‘No more questions – supply exhausted!’ To answer all of the questions that do arise de facto, you have to go beyond this world, and that means that some principle of extrinsic causality is universally valid [as discussed earlier].”
3. Finally, to complete the argument we meet the syllogism:
If the real is being (the intelligible) then God exists. (Major Premise)
The real is intelligible (being). (Minor Premise)
Therefore, God exists.
Minor Premise: The real is intelligible (being).
That the real is intelligible is nothing other than the basic position, what we know by the structure of our minds in knowing. If this is not true than being is unintelligible and therefore any questions cannot receive answers (how does one unintelligently distinguish which questions are intelligent and which are not?). So for anything to be intelligible the whole must be intelligible (at various levels, of course), otherwise there could be no knowledge. If being was not intelligible then you could not know it was not intelligible, therefore it must be intelligible.
Major Premise: If the real is being (the intelligible) then God exists.
Lonergan says: “Only if there is, at the root of all reality, an unrestricted act of understanding [all is known and intelligible] that freely creates everything else that is [being is existent through judgment, not just conceptual], and in doing so acts intelligently and reasonably – only if the whole of reality depends upon God, and God is absolute understanding – can it be true that the real is being, that the real is intelligible [by extrinsic causality].”
Only by having God [a Being who is absolute understanding in act – creation] is it possible that all further questions can have answers. “Only insofar as you posit the formally unconditioned, as not only intelligible [definition of being and reality] but also intelligent [act of correct understanding in extrinsic causality] – and all the other properties that can be deduced from that [simplicity, one, omniscient, a temporal, etc.] – can it be true that the real is being, that the real is intelligible.”
Thus since the major and minor premises are true, the conclusion must follow: Therefore, God exists.
Phew! We have come a long way and I assume by now your minds are pretty tired and worn out, maybe excited or just confused. That is fine; I don’t expect anyone to get the argument on the first try, like all things it must be slowly appropriated over time so don’t fell like it needs to jump out at you. But hopefully you will have the basic structure of it and can rehearse it for yourselves in your own time; remember knowledge only comes through personal understanding and rational reflection. Ultimately this means the hard work begins with you!
But all we have done so far is determine that there is a God, a transcendent Being with certain characteristics (intelligent, simple, one, omniscient, a temporal, etc.), we haven’t said anything about who this God is, which is what Christianity is all about. So in quick brushstrokes (since I know you are tired!) let’s have a crack at two questions which further arise (of course!) following the argument: the question of evil and the question of a solution.
III. Problem of Evil – Basic Sin
The Problem of Evil can be separated into three types of evils: physical evils, moral evils, and basic sin.
Let us call basic sin the fact that human beings (with free-will) often do not choose what is rationally obligatory but do choose what is repugnant in their courses of action. So basic sin is the fact that all of us at various times choose what is not reasonable [being nasty to a friend] and ignore what is reasonable [helping someone in need]. This basic sin leads to moral evils in that evils are committed by moral beings (us), but these are really secondary to the basic fact that these can be committed. Physical evils are the breakdowns in the natural process of world order, an order governed by probabilities as well as deterministic structures (quantum mechanics as well as classical mechanics). These are to be expected in such a nature, but moral evils cannot be explain in such a way because they involve intelligent (and hence moral – since to be moral is nothing other than to choose the Good which is also the True) brings.
Basic sin therefore is a fact which is in need to a solution; this is clear because being cannot be unintelligent (for we could not know it was unintelligent if it were so, see above), therefore there must ultimately be a solution to the issue of basic sin if everything above is correct, which we have been convinced of.
IV. Solution to the Problem – Christianity
It is in the solution to the problem where the world religions come in. Obviously any religion which does not see the problem of basic sin existing cannot be a true account of the world and God. This rules out any religion like Hinduism, Buddhism, Taoism, etc., for which there is no basic sin or problem of evil. Easy enough!
Now there are three religions which meet the above two criteria (Existence of God and Problem of Evil), obviously there are Christianity, Judaism, and Islam. It is from these three (or some unknown religion?) which we must ultimately find the intelligibility of nature. So a short examination from back to front (by no means exhaustive!).
1. Islam – from my understanding of Islam (which is limited, I will admit) the concept of ‘free-will’ and therefore moral agents is not permissible. Islam’s doctrine of providence seems to allow only a form of either fatalistic determinism, or a form of theological compatibilism (free yet not free) which would have to be judged on its own merits (this is an intense area of philosophic dispute which I am not sure how to solve by itself!). Assuming that traditional Islamic doctrine does profess some form of theological determinism this would remove the reality of moral evils and therefore question basic sin in a serious way. A solution to this might be brought about, but I have yet to see or hear of it. So for me, Islam is not an option philosophically because of its commitment to some form of theological determinism (very different to say, Thomas Aquinas’ work).
2. Judaism – obviously I am not inclined to consider Judaism apart from Christianity since Christianity (and Jesus Christ) claims to be the fulfillment of Judaism; but just for fun let’s assume that Judaism can stand alone historically and theologically from Christianity. Does Judaism provide a solution to the Problem of Evil? It seems to me that it does not. Although it has some form of solution in the sacrificial system of the Mosaic covenant (remember, the solution must be physical because we live in a physical world; Gnosticism will not do!), it appears that this is non-existent today and deemed faulty in Jewish theology. Even in the Psalms of the Hebrew Scriptures we find passages discussing how sacrifices of burnt offerings is not what God desires, but rather a clean heart. But I don’t see anything in Judaism answering this demand; which is why ultimately I see Christianity as the necessary fulfillment of it.
3. Christianity – so out of all the world religions which have a shot at answering the Existence of God and the Problem of Evil, it appears to me (and hopefully to you) that only Christianity is capable of making sense of the world. This is not to say that there are no mysteries, mystery is an essential part of being, but these are known unknowns which will ultimately be known by God, of course. Since the solution must conform to the problem, Lonergan gives the basic structure of the solution: it must be one, universally accessible and permanent, harmonious continuation of the actual order of the universe, not add new genus or species [a new animal!], consist of a higher understanding [extrinsic causality] – a ‘supernatural’ form, must be dynamic, must respect free will and consent of men, accord with probabilities, willingness to conform will be charity, must effect the social order.
Remember at this point Lonergan has done nothing strictly ‘theological’, he has worked this all out from philosophy and his structure of being as determined by the structure of mind. But, as Hugo Meynell comments: “Where the shape of the hat is as closely specified as this, the identity of the rabbit which is concealed under it scarcely needs to be added. The actual ‘emergent trend and full realization of the solution’ are to be found, when the facts of history are scrutinised, in the history of the ancient Israelite nation and its culmination in the words and deeds of Jesus Christ [mainly cross and resurrection!].”
So Christianity is the only solution to the Problem of Evil (basic sin) which is philosophically capable, let alone historically verifiable, according to these principles, which we have built up from nothing other than the process we all know so well in coming to know something in the world.
posted by Hans-Georg Gadamer @ 7:27 am
14 comments
14 Comments:
Haha! I think I win for longest post ever! I was thinking of publishing this in pieces, but I thought I would throw it up all at once so no one would read it! Enjoy!
I read it.
I think that means I have to send you a 'ice lolly'.
I think you made a mistake, I think the phrase you're looking for is "tensile strength." Don't thank me, I'm just glad I could help salvage this post...
Jacks - thanks for that! I was worried there was a whole somewhere in the argument and I am glad you found it!
Now that you went back and changed it, I find my agnosticism much harder to hold onto... good work!
This is good stuff. It's funny how our religion gets to line up with our metaphysics, isn't it? You remind me of Copleston in his debate with Russell.
Copleston: But there must be a first cause, necessarily.
Russell: Hem, haw, er, um.
Copleston: QED.
Russell: I'm going to live to be like 150.
I just don't know how far this takes us. Sometimes you tell me that any thinking person, if they're thinking clearly, HAS to end up believing in God once they start down any of your metaphysical paths. I don't agree with this, because I thought we'd both given up on the Cartesian model of people as truth-perceiving robots. Say I write a perfect defense of democracy as the best form of government. I'm 100% convinced that it is the best, of the current forms. I'm really not open to changing my mind, and I could probably construct some decent syllogisms to prove it. Would we want to say then that anyone who reads my "proof" HAS to end up agreeing with me, and if they don't, they're lying to themselves, or not thinking clearly, or being intellectually dishonest? (I'm not asking a rhetorical question here--I really want to know what you think.) We have mathematical and logical proofs that it's really hard to disagree with on one side, and political and religious proofs on the other. They can share the same forms and the political and religious can be just as rigorous and correct as the math and logic, but people are just so flexible with their beliefs that they're able to ignore them without problem.
So--I should also ask, what was your aim with this essay?
Charles - nice Copleston/Russell reference!
First a comment on the aim of the post, second on the democracy thing.
I don't think anyone will be converted because they see a syllogism which can't be refuted. That's crazy modernist stuff. What we have here is a proof for the existence of God (fitting all the traditional Greek characteristics) which is the natural and reasonable outworking of how we think. I think it is irrefutable since I agree with Lonergan that his cognitive structure (three part knowing) which he develops in Insight is irreversible. So if you are intellectually honest I think you have no way of denying God's existence. Now what is important to not is that none of us are 'intellectually honest', Lonergan calls this the polymorphic consciousness of man. We have tons of conflicting desires which cloud the 'pure desire to know' which is what governs knowledge. I won't go into why this isn't some Gnostic modernist account of knowing, just trust me that Lonergan has fully developed his philosophy in the critical dimension concerning linguistic and hermeneutical realism (His main thesis is "There are no brute facts" which is the same as Nietzsche's "There are no facts, only interpretation"). But we are conflicted internally and so just because this argument is irrefutable doesn't mean that it has power over you. What it does mean is that God is a fully rational and consistent reality which can be in some way verified by understanding who we are. I think this is Romans 1 stuff, really. But you can't just throw this argument on a table and say "Now do you believe?". You could, but it wouldn't do much.
2. On the issue of democracy and perfect proofs, I think that case is invalid because the two realities are different. No one (I hope!) argues that democracy is on the same ontological level as God. In fact what seems to be going on there is a proof for democracy would never reach the third step of Lonergan's, it would always be stuck on the insight and conceptual level. But how does one verify a particular arrangement of government? What does that mean, anyways? Does democracy 'exist'? If so, how does it exist? So I would never expect a serious proof for democracy because it doesn't have an existence of any sort, I think (unless you are a Platonist and believe in the Form of Democracy). Now it must be admitted that God doesn't 'exist' in the same way that humans, animals, etc. exist (this is Heidegger's onto-ontological issue), but I would say because of the analogy of being God exists in a way that is fuller than our existence, so can be discussed as such, whereas I don't see either an ontic or an ontological reality to democracy. God is not ontic, but he is ontological (Being itself, to use Aquinas), whereas democracy is not even an ontic reality (the really real to use Lonergan, I suppose). So I think the argument falls down on the misunderstanding of a metaphyics involving ontological realities.
Does that make sense? I gave a lecture for a philosophical society here on Tuesday evening and this was the lecture I gave, so I thought I would share it. I don't expect it to convert anyone by itself, but it seems to me that Lonergan does a great job of showing why believing in God is basically the most rational thing to do and to deny his existence involves you in counter-positions which can easily be reversed. But the other key to Lonergan is self-appropriation, knowledge is not something on a page out there, it is something you experience, understand, and judge to be correct. So unless you know God to be true because you have full experienced and understood and reflected on his argument it is meaningless to call it a proof. In that sense his argument is more like an existential reflection maybe; but I think it is incredibly powerful nonetheless and gives me comfort in being reminded of the reasonableness of belief.
I don’t get metaphysics because I don’t think it is an honest endeavor, or at least, my encounters with it – limited as they may be – have not as yet given me hope that it does what it claims to be doing. I am going to attempt to articulate why that is, what I think metaphysics is useful for, and then pose a few question to you, one about this particular argument and one in general.
So first, I will agree that this proof is rigorous and valid and I can’t see any major problems with it. Here’s the thing: Lonergan’s proof (or your representation of it) is based on a conception of knowing that is not equally rigorous. This is consistently my experience with metaphysics: the assumptions that are made in order to establish some starting points are highly contingent, situated, contestable notions that are somehow supposed to lead to metaphysical, unmediated, universally valid notions. If the goal of metaphysics is to establish universally valid beliefs, then it seems to me impossible that one might achieve those by building from locally valid beliefs. I agree (I think) with Lonergan’s three stages of knowing, but we wouldn’t want to say that they are universally valid or that they reflect in some deeply true way how it is that we actually think and acquire/produce knowledge. And that’s the problem with metaphysics as far as I’m concerned: it doesn’t get us where it promises to get us, which is out of situated, contingent social reality to universally valid reality land.
So, where does it get us? Well, quite simply, it seems to get us to the highest aspirations and fullest implications of those contingent social beliefs we have. It helps to articulate the fullness of what it is that we know and believe, even if those things that we know and believe aren’t of the kind that they purport to be. All knowledge is situated, mediated, social knowledge. We don’t escape that. We aren’t logical creatures, we are narrative creatures and narrative, it turns out is how we know. Metaphysics is how we rigorously tell our stories and rigorously point to the implications of them. It doesn’t – and can’t – get us purchase on anything outside of our stories, but it does help us know them a bit better. To the degree that metaphysicians are honest about that, then metaphysics is an invaluable endeavor. To the degree that they think they are somehow escaping the boundaries of human social existence, they are fooling themselves.
So, finally, some questions.
First, I have two questions about the first premise – Being is intelligible.
1) I wonder what we mean by that.
“Because being is intelligible: it is what is to be known by correct understanding; by definition, it is the intelligible. Being has to be the intelligible to be what is to be known by correct understanding, because the intelligible is all that correct understanding knows.”
I think that is absolutely right, but what is it we are talking about when we say “being”? If we identify “being” as that which is to be known by correct understanding, and we come to know “being” through correct understanding, then I fail to see what the content of the category “being” encapsulates.
2) Does Lonergan believe that we have unmediated access to “being”? In the case of rocks, for instance, does he think that when we look at or ponder or attempt to know a rock, that we are pondering and looking at and attempting to know the rock as such? If he does, I would say that this is a highly contestable notion.
Second, I have two general questions:
1) Have I made any errors or, out of ignorance, been negligent of longstanding refutations of some of my points?
2) At what points, if any, do you disagree with me?
J. morg - thanks for the insightful comments! I think I agree with most of them, although I see your comments as correctives to the field of metaphysics as opposed to its destruction. A few general points and then on to specifics concerning your questions.
General points
1. I don't know what your metaphysical background is, but I am deeply suspicious when someone says "its not an honest endeavo(u)r". I think there is a lot of wollyness around for sure, but I think that metaphysics is just a given; debating whether it is right or not is like saying consciousness or reality doesn't exist. So although all three can have sophists attacking them I think it is impossible to ultimately deny that metaphysics exists and has an important role in true knowledge of reality.
2. Metaphysics strictly defined in the simplest terms I guess would be the overarching scheme or nature of reality which undergirds and guides all specific disciplines. So if we want to talk about reality coherently (and I assume we do) then we need a metaphysic. If you want to have a discussion between a physicist and a biologist, or a psychologist and a sociologist, or even a artist and a theologian you need some base which allows the discussion to happen. Metaphysics is that "discussion space" which adjudicates overall claims and allows for disciplines to discuss things in a coherent fashion.
Importantly this does not mean that metaphysics holds all the answers and the other disciplines are climbing the mountain to the top. But metaphysics sets the terms for the debate. For instance, Lonergan's metaphysics says that reality has both determinate components and statistical components in it, so any science (of whatever discipline) which tried to deny the ultimacy of one of these elements would be immediately ruled out of court because it could not be speaking about reality. Now what these statistical elements (quantum probabilities, evolutionary adaptations, subconsious variations, etc.) are is left to be worked out by the various disciplines (same goes for deterministic parts); what metaphysics says is "here is what we expect in outline, now get to work on detail".
To my mind if anyone denies the ultimacy of metaphysics they are saying that physics, biology, chemistry, sociology, psychology, etc. cannot communicate with each other since they speak about totally separate realities. This would be a serious claim of nihilism and would then be self-defeating and unintelligible since we obviously can discuss different levels of interconnected reality (the quantum effects in radiation effect gene mutation while not determining them, for example).
So metaphysics is necessary as an overall system or framework from which to discuss reality, leaving the details and conjugates of that reality to be determined and discovered by specific disciplines working with their own tools and methods.
With that in mind, on to specific questions (which may already have been attempted above):
1. I suppose there will always be a reflexive principle in any knowing since we can't transcend ourselves or reality in a way to get an "ultimate viewpoint" from which to survey reality. As Christians we don't have to worry about this reflexivity since we assume the Creator has ordered the universe in an intelligent fashion and therefore the intelligibility and foundations are laid transcendentally even if we can only discover them "experientially" or a posteriorially. No problem though, if we are Christians (base assumption) then we accept this transcendent grounding.
2. In Lonergan's case I actually think he does rigorously defend and define his conception of knowing. Insight is massive and complex and he really runs over all the counter-positions in there. If there is a rigorous conception of knowing then Lonergan has it, mainly because he is building off of Aristotle and Aquinas, two titans in their own right. I think the more important question is concerning your claim about its "universal validity". That is a good question and I think is answered by the experience of the case. Lonergan's three stages (steps) of knowing are put forth as universally valid because they make the base of all knowing. His claim is that these three steps of cognition are the only way we know anything and that any other cognitive process without these three steps will be deemed insufficient.
This is a bold claim to our anti-metanarrative ears, but I think it is important to emphasize his aims again: in his metaphysics he is not trying to give some all singing, all dancing account of the world and everything in it; he is merely trying to give a starting point of reference and fixed base to deem what is true or not in knowing. The specifics can get as anti-foundational (and he is an anti-foundationalist) as you want, he is only describing the pattern or process of knowing, not its content.
In his own words, Insight aims to "Thoroughly understand what it is to understand, and not only will you understand the broad lines of all there is to be understood but also you will possess a fixed base, an invariant pattern, opening upon all further developments of understanding(22)." His claim is that there is no knowledge which you can present to him which is not to be gotten through this cognitional dynamics and, as impressive (or arrogant) as it seems, I think he is more or less correct.
So his process is rigorous I think, but I would have to spend much more time developing that.
3. As far as being abstract I think Lonergan's account (and metaphysics in general) is well oriented to the real and concrete (that was Aristotle's move from Plato by setting the forms as unitary with the matter as opposed to ideally present in the realm of Ideas). In fact, it demands that the specifics be worked out because the broad outlines of reality are worked out in metaphysics. It is like saying "Well, we know this will show up, so where is it?" I think that is immanently immanent.
4. I am running out of time and space, I imagine, so just one more comment on being and we can call this comment a night for further clarification. In Lonergan's understanding Being is defined as "the object of the pure desire to know", which sounds abstract but because he is working with Aquinas it becomes immediately apparent what Being is: God. This is the case because in Aquinas God is both form and act together, he is the essence and existence together as no other is found (for this distinction Aquinas calls it the 'real distinction' whereas Heidegger says the same thing in his 'ontological difference', which of course I am partial too a la Balthasar). So the ultimate object of knowing is God in his Being, which is the Being which brings and sustains all beings in their existence. Once you take on board Heidegger's critique of onto-theology and ontic metaphysics (in forms of nominalism, gnosticism, idealism, etc.) this all makes more sense and ends up with the traditional Catholic position: all we desire is the beatific vision.
Okay, those thoughts are rambling about half-way through but I hope I have at least started to give a better definition to metaphysics so you will be more convinced of its "use", or rather its necessity. I agree with your critiques of a lot of metaphysics out there, but I think getting back to the Aristotle-Aquinas-Lonergan or Aquinas-Heiddeger-Balthasar versions of it provide an essential element to our understanding of reality. Anything make sense there?
Hans,
Thanks so much for the lengthy, remarkably lucid reply. I greatly appreciate it and have taken some time to respond to some of your clarifiers with a few of my own. I will finish with an attempt at articulating some affirmative position.
“I see your comments as correctives to the field of metaphysics as opposed to its destruction.”
Absolutely. The reason I claimed that “metaphysics isn’t an honest endeavor” is because I don’t think that metaphysical investigation gets us to the place it purports to and those who do the investigations don’t admit that. So my claim isn’t that metaphysics should be thrown out or isn’t worth investigating or that it isn’t the case, it is that we need to be very clear about what it is that we are doing and what it is that we are not doing.
“Metaphysics strictly defined in the simplest terms I guess would be the overarching scheme or nature of reality which undergirds and guides all specific disciplines…. Metaphysics is that ‘discussion space’ which adjudicates overall claims and allows for disciplines to discuss things in a coherent fashion.”
I absolutely agree. What I object to is the claim that this “overarching scheme… which undergirds and guides all specific disciplines” exists outside of culture; beyond human social existence.
Correct me if I’m wrong, but you (and Lonergan I presume) imagine that metaphysics is that set of principles that exist outside of all contingent reality (probably God and those things that are the case necessarily because of His nature) that then informs and determines all contingent reality (physical reality, social reality, language, radio waves, space, etc.). You also seem to imagine that, through rigorous investigation, one might be able to transcend contingent reality to be able to make claims about ultimate reality such that the claims are not contingent.
If so, then I agree with the first part and disagree with the second. This notion that we might have unmediated, clear vision into the absolute or be able to make any intelligible claim about it apart from cultural reality out of which we make such a claim is absurd. So I agree with you on what metaphysics is, I disagree (from what I can gather) with you on what metaphysical investigation is. Metaphysical investigation, as far as I can tell, has no necessary connection with metaphysical reality. Metaphysical investigation, rather than leaving behind the culture of the investigator, is in reality the rigorous clarifying of that culture.
You seem to be arguing that metaphysical investigation and the conclusions that come out of it create “discussion space” because they get to some point beyond culture. I agree that it creates discussion space, but not because it gets outside of culture, but because it reflects the deeply held assumptions of a culture out of which (locally) everyone is operating.
“As Christians we don't have to worry about this reflexivity since we assume the Creator has ordered the universe in an intelligent fashion and therefore the intelligibility and foundations are laid transcendentally even if we can only discover them "experientially" or a posteriorially.”
Right, but that assumes that we have unmediated access to “the universe.” That was my question about rocks. When we talk about rocks, are we talking about rocks as such or are we talking about our talk about rocks? That seems to me a really difficult question and the answer seems determinate for your project. The act of interpretation is not the same as the objects/subjects being interpreted. We don’t and can’t know the object/subject being interpreted apart from the act of interpretation. It isn’t enough to claim that the universe reflects transcendental foundations; one would have to articulate some sort of transcendental anthropology.
Which brings me back to my real concern: we imagine that truth exists outside of culture and that it might be accessible such that we could know it a-culturally. If human beings are interpretive, meaning-making beings and culture is the web of significance both that they make and that make them in symbiosis, then it seems that we cannot deal with metaphysics without dealing directly with anthropology and culture. As far as I can tell, revelation – particularly in the form of the Incarnation - is the acknowledgement of this seemingly simple but almost always ignored truth. We are so obsessed with “getting outside” of culture that we forget that we can’t and, what’s more, we don’t have to. That is what revelation/Incarnation is all about; it is the acknowledgement by God that, like Him, we are moral, meaning-making, social beings and cannot be or know apart from our moral, meaning-making, meaning-made, social existence. It is the acknowledgement that, in order to give definitive information about that which is true outside of culture (which, strictly speaking, is only the Persons of the Trinity), He would have to radically come into culture. So at the end of the day, the only way out is by staying in.
Oh, two more clarifiers. In my most recent comment, I said:
“Metaphysical investigation, as far as I can tell, has no necessary connection with metaphysical reality. Metaphysical investigation, rather than leaving behind the culture of the investigator, is in reality the rigorous clarifying of that culture.”
I want to stress “necessary.” I do think that, because of the Incarnation, metaphysical investigation does have some connection to metaphysical reality. I don’t think, however, that such a connection is extra-cultural, but deeply and essentially cultural.
I also said,
“…one would have to articulate some sort of transcendental anthropology.”
To be clear, I think that is the prerequisite for this sort of work and by far the more important project. I think it can be done and I think that all good theology either is, is rooted in, or implicitly works from a good theological anthropology.
J. Morgs - thanks for this excellent response and apologies for not getting back to it earlier. As you can imagine I am out of my league doing cultural analysis with you, but I will try to make competent comments and see where our lines cross. I think our disagreements are mainly definitional at this point and it is helpful to clarify. In saying so, let me clear up the question of "immediate knowledge" and "transcending contingent reality."
I totally agree with you that there is no access to reality except through culture and context. I take this to be the basic Heideggerian/Gadamerian hermenuetical approach which has proven so effective in our understanding of reality and truth. So I am absolutely affirming in what you say about mediated knowledge, and I know Lonergan is as well (he focuses a good deal of time and effort to dispel the myth of immediate knowing). I think the difference is that this mediated knowledge does not make truth culturally relative as it seems like you might be arguing (although I doubt it).
Again, Lonergan's method is not a method in the sort of scientific formula which automatically produces true knowledge; far from it! Lonergan and Gadamer are one here in that there is no 'method' for discerning truth. Rather, each of their epistemology's seem to be descriptive rather than prescriptive. Lonergan is describing what happens when all true knowledge is attained through the three-step process in the same way as Gadamer is describing how insights are made given the fusion of horizons and appropriate prejudices involved in interpretation. To me it seems they are both describing the process in different ways, or Gadamer is spelling out the second step of Lonergan's process (Insight and understanding) in more detail. Both are focused on the dialectical method of conversation in coming to know in a particular culture and context.
In saying that I think Lonergan's metaphysics is not a-cultural but rather is the outline of what happens in any culture in producing knowledge. He is trying to describe the basic pattern of knowing (based on our human nature and our being images of God) which then goes to work on the given cultural background and empirical residue a knower has. The fact remains that Lonergan's metaphysics is a further development of the Aristotelian-Thomist understanding of mind and reality which is of course conditioned by the cultural milieu the Greeks and Medievals found themselves in.
To make this more specific I think there is a cultural privileging going on in Lonergan (specifically the Greek tradition wedded with Hebraic revelation producing Aquinas) but since truth is always culturally conditioned and if we hold truth to be one (which I assume we do after appropriate interpretive understandings) than this privileging should be expected. In concrete terms, Africans will never come up with Greek metaphysics but that doesn't mean that their metaphysics (if they have one) is true; it probably approximates the Real but just doesn't have the right contingent factors behind it (the Mediterranean beaches?).
So I think Lonergan is defended against charges of a-culturalism because he is very explicit about the cultural rootedness of his metaphysics. But deeper than this cultural conditioning in his account seems to be the human cognitive structure which he sees as being monolithic. To refute his knowing structure means demonstrating that knowledge is not attained through his three-fold process, which he thinks is impossible to do since doing so would involve all three steps.
As to the issue of whether we are talking about rocks themselves or rocks as they appear to us, I think the answer is both. In some sense we never get away from the appearance of rocks but unless we want to trap ourselves in Kantian Idealism (which seems self refuting anyways) we need to make the Heideggerian shift and talk about reality as presenting itself to us or disclosing itself. In this sense we know the rock truly by knowing it through its relationships to us. But this sensual dependence does not mean we do not know the rock in itself but rather that we do not know everything about the rock in itself (hence the cultural conditioning again). Philosophical hermeneutics is perfectly in line with a form of realism; it just means we need to remain open to further developments in our knowledge; which is exactly what good science (in any discipline) always does.
So to know the rock through our experience of it is not to know it only as presented to us but to know something of its true reality which is presented to us contingently. I know Thomas Kuhn denies this move but I think Michael Polanyi refutes him quite well in his own Philosophy of Science account.
On your point about transcendental anthropology I think this is exactly what Lonergan is getting on about; finding what it means to be a finite human being who is driven by a pure desire to know and a polymorphic consciousness which muddies the waters. Lonergan's account is entirely personalistic in much the same way as John Paul II's Theology of the Body and I think founds the metaphysical process again in those which we know best about: ourselves. This means that knowledge of reality is contingent but that reality is not; it is the being sustained by Being himself.
There's another discussion of Bernard Lonergan's proof on
Strange Notions.
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