Monday, October 23, 2006

Martin Heidegger: Helping Old Ladies Worship Jesus since 1927 AD



Mark 10:17 And as he was setting out on his journey, a man ran up and knelt before him (Jesus!) and asked him, "Good Teacher, what must I do to inherit eternal life?"

And Jesus said: "You must make a cognitive assent to something called substitutionary atonement so that you can sit and listen to 45 minute sermons about what is in the Greek and slowly gain more knowledge of Christian stuff."
And the man went away sad because it didn't make any sense to him.

Okay, so I am playing a little hard and fast here, but a question came to me earlier: "What it means to be a Chritian?" Take a moment and answer that for yourself. I have a certain answer but I am concerned that many evangelicals display or give off an entirely inappropriate one. For instance, does being a Christian ultimately mean gaining more theological knowledge or more exegetical skill in determing what the Bible says? Obviously not, for if this were so then the majority of the "Christians" in the world would be barely that. Then you have the problem of Christianity before the printing press, did God just let them off the hook? I don't think so.

The deeper issue though seems to be our attitude towards a certain type of knoweldge: that is knowledge of facts and assertions. Somehow or other the knoweldge of facts seems to have become the hallmark of certain parts of Christianity; you can't be a "good" Christian unless you know that you have imputed righteousness from the atonement applied by the Holy Spirit through various means except by your baptism. Confessionalism, which once was a way to mark boundries in churches, has become the hallmark of your relation to Christ; the more theological facts you know the better. But like the man in the story, to most of us this way of seeing the world doesn't make sense of how we live. Living is not about knowing facts, it is about being-in-the-world. And here is where Heidegger comes to the rescue of old ladies who go to church ever week without "knowing" what is going on in the Eucharist.

Heidegger sees a serious mistake in ontology which has been carried down through the history of philosohpy since Plato (!). I don't want to go in depth on this, if you are interested I encourage you to give Being and Time a go, it is well worth the effort! But back to Heidegger's thesis. He sees our metaphysics as something detached from life; we see objects and think about objects, and make theories about objects, all as subjects. Heidegger wants to scream Nein! to this whole notion of subject/object distinction because he says we are not beings seperate from the world, be are beings-in-the-world, or Dasein. He says that the way we normally see "knowledge" in this old framework is through objects being "present-at-hand", which to him is a derivative form of knowledge and existence. The more fundamental way of being in the world is involvement with the world as "ready-to-hand". When we are being fundamentally we are involved in the world, not speculating about it. This is the "everydayness" which Heidegger sees as most fundamental in ontology, whereas traditional ontology stepped past this mode of being to a detached and less "real" mode.

Okay, let's have an example or two just to get the feel of this. Take the case of writing a letter. There is a world of involvement in this little operation, but we will focus on the paper, the pen and the person (sounds like a Protestant sermon, eh?). Traditional metaphysics would want to break the whole situation down into its constituent parts, i.e. what the pen is doing, what the paper is doing, what the person is doing. We could then go deeper, say the person and look into their muscle interactions, then their neuro interactions, and then...well you get the picture. The problem is that in doing this "deconstruction" we have actually missed what is going on in the involvement whole of the activity. Heidegger says you can't break Dasein up like that becauce you can't seperate being from the world, hence the hypens in being-in-the-world. For instance, while you are writing it is absolutely imperitive that you have no "object" oriented knowledge of the pen at the moment. If you did recognize the pen as an object in this detached fashion you would not be able to write! The same goes for the paper and even the person. When something is happening (anything, even thinking?) there is a total involvement of the world which can not be seperated. It is in this case that Heidegger says object reflection is a second order form of knowledge.

Knowledge to Heidegger is more "knowing how" than "knowing what" about something. The second is derivative from the first, present-at-hand comes after a break down in ready-to-hand knowledge. Here is another example. I was practicing squash today, as I am wont to do sometimes, and I was trying to reflect on what I was doing. But when I tried to think about each shot and each motion, I was no longer able to play the game. In order to play squash I needed to be involved in the whole, not thinking in part. This goes for any sporting activity really, you can't think of every motion otherwise you won't be able to move! It is much like the story of the centipede being asked how it coordinates all its legs. When it tried to think about it it got all tangled up, but before being asked and having to reflect on it the centipede was happily able to walk along. In traditonal metaphysics this "non-reflective) stance has been called "unconsciousness", but not the negative attitude to it. It is not-conscious, and in that sense has the feeling of not being the right mode of being. Heidegger wants to turn this on its head by saying the involvement in the world pre-reflectively is the normal and primary mode of existence, reflection is always a secondary and detached way of existing.

So you are probably wondering how this all fits in with old ladies at church on Sunday? Well, the traditional evangelical understanding of the faith of these old ladies is that they are not as "good" at being Christian since they lack the requisite doctrinal or reflective knowledge of the faith. Most people will deny this implication, but I think they are just making excuses. You can find this out by asking if anything needs to be done for these old ladies as compared to me, the theological student. Evangelical answer: time for Alpha or Christianity Explored! But you can hopefully see that this understanding can be turned around by Heidegger's metaphysics since these old ladies do not have a deficient life in the faith; in fact they may be "more" Christian than many reflective evangelicals who do not attend church like the ladies. As a case in point, these old ladies do know a lot about the Christian faith; it is just a involvement and ready-to-hand form of the knowledge, which Heidegger says is the primordial form of being. When asked about Eucharist they will respond by saying "I go every week" or "I communicate every week." This is not a meaningless action. In it they are affirming in the strongest terms that they believe the Lord Jesus is here and alive today, and working in his people to those who recieve him. The liturgy itself is part of this Christian faith, it inculcates Christianity in not primarily reflection but in active involvement; which is the most important form of living, whether playing squash or worshipping Jesus.

So old ladies dutifully following the liturgy are not "less" Christian because they can't tell you how Justification by Faith works, they are more sure about Jesus and their relationship because they are involved in it. It is only on reflection that doubt can arise; while playing squash I never doubt my existence, but if I sit around long enough I can try and convince myself. In this sense it is the liturgy in its "pre-reflective" splendour which constitutes the Church; for the Christian faith is not about thinking, it is about living.

29 Comments:

At 8:54 am, Blogger Hans-Georg Gadamer said...

Context! I am not against religious or doctrinal knowledge! That should be quite clear, I hope. Just trying to make sense out of the average Christian throughout the ages and how they "keep the faith", because I think they do.

Redness, this involvement in Christianity is what you are always trying to get me into, right?

 
At 10:32 am, Blogger Unknown said...

I concur, especially with respect to your sentiments about all those worshipers prior to the modern era. Before the proliferation of printed materials, everybody was living the liturgy. Since then, we've created armchairs where we read — in solitude — our favorite tomes on this or that doctrinal issue. As helpful as that may be, it is not Christianity.

We have indeed made much ado about mere assensus.

 
At 4:32 pm, Blogger E. Twist said...

hans,

excuse my constant ineptness, I've come late to these games.

Doesn't an old lady's (or anyone for that matter) ability to explain the meaning behind the Eucharistic event presuppose some sort of detachment? Isn't comprehension always the bifurcation of subject/object? Isn't it fair to suppose that her involvement in the sacrament is carried on from a prior event, viz. cognition, acceptance, action?

I'm assuming that at some point she was forced to come to grips, on some level, with the subject of Christ. Without this it is doubtful that the sacramental act would have ever been considered as necessary to her being-in-the-world.

e.

 
At 12:47 am, Blogger Hans-Georg Gadamer said...

Erik - good point about presupposing detachment. I think that detachment is going on all the time; I just took a few moments to think about my computer AS a computer. But during that time I am not really doing anything, and of course I do not comprehend my computer correctly (I really don't know what makes a computer up). So there is detachment knowledge, but it is a second order kind.

I am not sure said old lady ever had to "come to grips" with the Eucharist. I imagine she was just taught to take it in confirmation class and she never really felt compelled to wrestle with the whole issue. She probably can't explain transubstantiation or any other form of presence, so I don't know if she ever came to grips with it.

The coming to grips with Christ is more interesting, but I am not sure that ever occurs in the detached subject/object way. It might, but in the moment of coming to grips with him you are at the same time totally seperated from him (although I am not sure we ever totally detach into subject/object components; what would that look like? We both still share a world and one of our making so we can never be totally detached).

Heidegger always uses hammer analogies. When you pick up a hammer (even for the first time) you already have an understanding in your mind about what it is and what you need to do and so forth. You didn't take a semester course on the molecular structure of a hammer, or the various ways of using it. You just became involved in hammering. You may later contemplate the hammer (epsecially if it breaks and you are confused as to why it won't hammer anymore), but this contemplation is not essential to the main task - hammering. Detached knowledge is second order in this case and always presupposes involvement with the whole before being detached. You have to know your way around before you can explain things. I much prefer directions from someone who has been down the route as opposed to someone who just looked at a map.

The main point is that detachment might occur ar various points, but the important knowledge is one of involvement. Detached knowledge can sometimes be helpful, but the main claim is that it is not essential to understanding. Just because the old lady can't "explain" the Eucharist doesn't mean she doesn't "know" Christ in the Eucharist. Detached knowledge is important, but not the primary level of knowing.

 
At 6:26 am, Blogger Kevin Winters said...

HGG,

But part of Heidegger's point is that there is no "detached" understanding per se. Even the supposedly "objective" accounts of physics must be understood within a context of practices, norms, and equipment by which its claims are intelligible. So even "detached" knowledge must be contextualized or else it is meaningless.

 
At 9:43 am, Blogger Hans-Georg Gadamer said...

Kevin, thanks for this clarification. You are totally right, there is no totally detached meaning since it is Dasein which allows the world to exist in a meaningful way. But we can take a semi-detached view when we shift from involvement to occurrent being. Here I follow Hubert Dreyfus' intepretation:

"Occurent beings are revealed when Dasein takes a detached attitude towards things and decontextualizes them - in Heidegger's terms, deworlds them." (256)

Knowledge of things "in themselves" is therefore impossible not because of the Kantian noema/phenomena split but because everything with meaning is involved in Dasein. But we can "detach" ourselves from involvement in some ways, even fi there is not a total seperation from cultural and linguistic horizons, etc.

Thanks for the clarification point.

 
At 4:42 am, Blogger E. Twist said...

hans,

thanks for the insights. Here are my thoughts.

The hammer analogy is fine except for the fact that it seems to me to assume, still, some prior detached knowledge. How does one come to a hammer and have any sense of its purpose without first having observed it in action? Couldn't such a witnessing be considered a form of detached knowledge?

Sure the observer never quite deduces the full extent of the molecular make up of the hammer he is witnessing, but does detached knowledge necessitate a pure correspondence? It seems to me that without some prior event of detachment true comprehension remains impossible.

Even an interaction between Carter and a toy hammer where, to us, Carter obviously misinterprets the correct use of the hammer has still, to some degree, observed the hammer from some level (even if it be rudimentary) of detachment. His involvement with what he sees can take place only once he has determined that this thing you and I call a hammer has actual physical properties and can be handled and flung about.

You said,

"Detached knowledge can sometimes be helpful, but the main claim is that it is not essential to understanding."

I'm still failing to see this. My sense is that understanding on any level presupposes some form of detachment. Now, good and true understanding on the other hand does seem to necessitate involvement. So for the purposes of having a "comprehension of meaning" the one involved in the Eucharist is awarded a higher order understanding than the one who simply observes it. But the move toward involvement must first pass through a lower order of detachment, which therefore renders it essential, not simply helpful.

 
At 11:22 am, Blogger Hans-Georg Gadamer said...

Erik, thanks for this, especially the insight with practical life experience! That is something not included in my horizon so is always helpful.
I think we cleared some of this up already, but the main issue in the second point is that "understanding" for heidegger means knowing how, not knowing what. Also it includes the fore-having, fore-sight, and fore-conception of the giveness of the world. No seperated Cartesian mind from world!

I think this is really a radical ontological stance, so I have trouble getting exactly what he is saying, but when I do graps it I find it compelling and quite impressive!

 
At 11:52 am, Blogger CharlesPeirce said...

I have no post-length comment and nothing to flip out about--kind of disappointing, actually.

I don't know. I've told you before that I haven't read Heidegger. He looms large in the background of figures I have studied--Sartre, Rorty, etc.--but I can't claim to have read, much less understood, anything he's written. Does that unqualify me to comment?

I guess my question for you is, do we really need this Heideggerian backup for the old ladies? I grant you that there can be worship in going through the motions, but when you say "you can't just look at the parts"--I don't agree. Some parts of science are about separating as much of the situation into constituents as possible, just as part of practicing for a sport is working only on your shot or only on your footwork. Right? Or was it that Heidegger's point really was "Quit trying to break things down into their parts and just look at the whole situation?" Maybe expound a little for me so I can flip out. =)

Thanks!

 
At 12:55 pm, Blogger Hans-Georg Gadamer said...

Charles - thanks for that. I was just commenting to someone last night that the conversation between Anglo-American philosophy and Continental Philosophy goes something like this:

A-A: All you guys ever do is write poetry!
C: Thanks! Poetry is the best way to understand reality!

Heidegger does loom large behind most thinkers today but as far as I can tell (from reading other sources) he has been grossly misunderstood by them. Satre (still stuck in Cartesianism) and Rorty (Stop avoiding the question of being!) especially. If you want a great introduction to Heidegger check out Hubert Dreyfus' "Being-in-the-world", it is Heidegger from a leading Anglo-American who has taken him quite seriously. Charles Taylor would agree.

As far as the seperating down bit, Heidegger thinks it has its place, but that detached form is really avoiding reality because it is bracketing out (Husserl?) the most essential parts: the whole world structure. Do this quick mental excercise to get the idea:

Think of an object, say a pen. Then take the scientific route and looker closer into the pen. What is it? Well, it is a collection of molecules together, mostly composite polymer ones. What are those? Well, they are atoms with nuclei and electrons (maybe?). What are those? Well, they are a collection of subatomic particles linked by other particles (gluons, etc.) What are those? Well, they are the manifestations of a fluxuating quantum field...

Two questions:
1. Can you stop this chain of "scientific" work somewhere?
2. What happened to the pen, because this sure doesn't sound like one?

Heidegger wants to make it clear that this kind of excercise is fine for what it does, but maybe for the most part a useless (where's the pen?) and fallible (Quantum Field Theory, what if we trade that for something else?) endeavour which destracts us from the everydayness of life - and ourselves.

So yes, he wants to say "stop seperating things" because in essence, being doesn't work that way; and therefore it only gets us further away from being-in-the-world, or Dasein.

Helpful?

 
At 1:53 pm, Blogger CharlesPeirce said...

Yes, helpful.

Rorty's response to all that is to say that there is no "correct" description of anything because descriptions are relative to purposes. So, where William James said "What would be better for us to believe?", Rorty says "What's your purpose?"

To continue with the pen example, it's a pen/a weapon/an instrument of the bourgeoisie/plastic and metal/a collection of molecules depending on your purpose, and no one description is correct.

What would the Heideg say to that?

 
At 1:35 am, Blogger Hans-Georg Gadamer said...

Charles - yes, thank you for the qualification with Rorty. Let me see if I can make a distinction between them. Rorty seems to me to be a "pragmatic relativist" in the sense that there is no "correct" description of reality, only descriptions that we give to situations because of our purposes. Heids would be very much in line with this, to an extent. The difference is about the word correct. Heids might be best described as a "plural realist" or a "hermeneutical realist". The difference between he and Rorty is subtle, but significant. Let me try to flesh this out a bit.

I am not a Rorty expert, so you will need to correct me when I go wrong, but it seems that Rorty thinks we name and describe things (such as the pen) because we have certain goals, projects, purposes in mind. In some sense which is basic then language seems to be a tool to Rorty. We have projects therefore we name things appropriately to fit in with those projects. No true reality is present here because if our projects were different we would have described the situation totally differently (when I am in physics class the pen is a set of atoms, when I am doing poetry, the pen is a sword). So all of this naming could be changed and is not dependent on any underlying reality as such.

Now Heids is a bit different on this. He is going to absolutely stress the hermeneutical situation as defining the naming process and such, but for Heids it is not we who name and describe things; things actually present themselves to us in the total involvement of Dasein. He describes Dasein as a "clearing" (think of an open field with a spotlight on it and corn fields around). "If we are Dasein, things will come". What happens in reality for Heidegger is that things themselves (remember his phenomenological background) disclose themselves as Dasein discloses reality. So it is not we who are doing the naming, but reality which is disclosing or unconcealing itself through Dasein. The motion is from reality to us in Heids as opposed to from us to reality in Rorty.

Gadamer completes Heids' metaphysics by discussing the being which brings about this disclosure: language. This is where we get the discussion of language as the "storehouse of being" and the phrase that "Being which can be understood is language." Language for Heids/Gadamer is not a tool but a ontological reality; language speaks us, we do not speak it. We can see this in the hermeneutical structure of reality and the fore-structures of understanding. Dasein is thrown into the world, which is thrown into language. So through various situations and discolsedness, Dasein "uncovers" different aspects of reality. In this sense the uncovering is true reality, although there may be different accounts of that same reality depending on the questions asked in a situation (this is why he is a plural realist). In this sense we are making contact with reality but our finitude forces us to be humble about the way in which we know - always incomplete, but true nontheless.

The key point for Heidegger is that to deny the correctness of our understanding would be to deny our ontological structure; we are Dasein, beings-in-the-world. It seems that Rorty follows Satre more on this aspect in the sense of still wanting to affirm a Cartesian speration of subjective knower and objective knowledge content. This kind of distinction of course leads to either relativism or solipcism (as Nietzsche saw and hammered!), but Heidegger does not go down this road because he thinks the distinction is not fundamental.

I am pretty confident that most of the Heidegger bit is correct in this discussion, but I am not at all an expert on Rorty, so you may need to correct me on his understanding in Cartesianism and realism. If I have unduly characterized him then just switch his name in this to Satre or someone else and let me know where I have misunderstood him, you know him quite well and far better than I!

 
At 6:35 am, Blogger JMC said...

But isn’t there something essentially human about being about to give an account? Humans are narrative, meaning-making creatures it seems to me. The more articulate the account, the fuller humanity is realized. So I am not sure I want to defend confessionalism or Scripture quoting contests, but I think I do want to defend articulate accounts. To what degree, then does Dasein hamper articulacy? Is there another way of being articulate? Is there another sort of account?

 
At 6:59 am, Blogger CharlesPeirce said...

Your assessment of Rorty is correct, I think—projects demand primacy, and descriptions and tools are then brought in to fit the project. For Rorty language is not THE tool, or THE interface, but A tool. Check this out (direct quote):

"No matter whether the tool is a hammer or a gun or a statement, tool-using is part of the interaction of the organism with its environment. To see the employment of words as the use of tools to deal with the environment, rather than as an attempt to represent the intrinsic nature of that environment, is to repudiate the question of whether human minds are in touch with reality... No organism, human or non-human, is ever more or less in touch with reality than any other organism."

So, you’re correct to oppose an account of language as an ontological reality to Rorty’s view of it as just one tool in the box. In fact, Rorty does not think that words like “ontology” or “epistemology” are special or even useful; to him they denote projects that are either bankrupt or must be kept personal.

I guess I still don’t understand Dasein. For Sartre, who I know considered himself influenced by Heidegger, “being-in-the-world” had specific consequences: God doesn’t exist; our choices define us; any account of human nature as an account is false; the only thing that matters is being authentic; etc. It seems more abstract for Heidegger, so I don’t know how to put it into practice. Both Sartre and Rorty have specific advice to give me. Does the Degg?

You wrote:

“Rorty follows Sartre more on this aspect in the sense of still wanting to affirm a Cartesian separation of subjective knower and objective knowledge.”

Sort of. As per my earlier comments, Rorty sees himself as explicitly repudiating sharp Cartesian distinctions altogether, not choosing between either side. He wishes he didn’t have to have a position on Descartes, you know? It’s tough being a pragmatist.

“This kind of distinction of course leads to either relativism or solipsism.”

Again, sort of. I don’t think people instantly become relativists or solipsists simply by doing this, but then again, some could.

“The key point for Heidegger is that to deny the correctness of our understanding would be to deny our ontological structure.”

Yeah. I don’t know. The key point for Sartre is living authentically in an existential world; the key point for Rorty is dropping the metaphysical backup and still hitting those sweet democratic/liberal projects hard. I mean, am I sitting here at my computer Dasein-ing right now? I’d like to be.

j. morgan, why would Dasein hamper account-giving and narrative-making? I’m not saying it wouldn’t, I just don’t understand your question.

 
At 7:16 am, Blogger Unknown said...

To support the notion that Rorty "is dropping the metaphysical backup and still hitting those sweet democratic/liberal projects hard," consider:

"One should try to abjure the temptation to tie in one's moral responsibilities to other people with one's relation to whatever idiosyncratic things or persons one loves with all one's heart and soul and mind (or, if you like, the things or persons one is obsessed with)" ("Trostsky and Wild Orchids," 1992). Questions about the metaphysical, the universal (which, according to Rorty, is really just a matter of getting as much intersubjective agreement as you can manage), and the ontological are basically useless in this construct.

Rorty's response to the old ladies is simply this: "Just because your quaint religious practices are merely weird, merely idiosyncratic, to practically to everybody else, don't slough them off. There is nothing sacred about universality which makes the shared automatically better than the unshared."

 
At 7:35 am, Blogger Hans-Georg Gadamer said...

Charles - thanks for that. If Rorty thinks language is A tool, is it a tool in the same sense as a hammer? Are there different levels of toolege? Is language a meta-tool? I think this is where Continental ups Anglo-American, and it seems to me that later Wittgenstein saw that.

Again, I think Sartre misunderstood Heidegger because he was still thinking of "me" vs. "the world", still being Cartesian. Robert Solomon affirms this as well in his works. Heidegger is really jumping out of that mold and saying not me vs. world, or even me in the world, but Dasein (me-in-the-world or me-world). Much more radical than Sartre and seems like Rorty.

As far as specific advice, Heidegger's practical outworking of his ontology (division II of B&T) is somewhat suspects since he went through some turns later. His political activity shows this as well. I am not sure exactly if there are "Heideggerian life-examples" to live by yet, although I don't know how specific Sartre is as opposed to Heidegger.

I guess a first shot would be to get back to being human in the peasant sense; so long walks in the black forest, skeptical use of certain technology; refusual to fall interely into "das Man" or the group mentality. Be "authentic" is coined by him and taken by Sartre, so they might not be very different in application, except freedom of the self is not what Heidegger is shooting for. He wants you to realize that you are finite (being towards death) and that therefore what you do matters in the world.

Sorry if that seems pretty vague, I am not as pragmatist as you but I appreciate the question. I guess read more German poetry (like Rainer Rilke) and participate in traditional practices such as Church (Heidegger asked for a Catholic funeral service). I need to think about it more, I am not inclined to be as practically minded.

J. Morgs - I echo Charles in the sense that I don't see why Heidegger's account leaves out our narration. We are the beings who narrate in the sense that the world comes into being and meaning through us. We in a sense have a much more ontologically significant narrative function in Heidegger than in the normal account where reality is not given true meaning through our stories and language. I could be missing you though.

 
At 7:36 am, Blogger Hans-Georg Gadamer said...

Charles - I think you are Dasein-ing at your computer. Let me know what part of reality is disclosed in its unconcealedness, could you?

 
At 8:34 am, Blogger JMC said...

“When you pick up a hammer (even for the first time) you already have an understanding in your mind about what it is and what you need to do and so forth. You didn't take a semester course on the molecular structure of a hammer, or the various ways of using it. You just became involved in hammering. You may later contemplate the hammer (epsecially if it breaks and you are confused as to why it won't hammer anymore), but this contemplation is not essential to the main task - hammering. Detached knowledge is second order in this case and always presupposes involvement with the whole before being detached. You have to know your way around before you can explain things. I much prefer directions from someone who has been down the route as opposed to someone who just looked at a map.”

Hans, this quote from a reply you wrote is the perfect instance of where my comment was directed. It wasn’t a challenge so much as it was a genuine question. I am way out of my league here, so bear with me.

So, to begin, I don’t understand humans as primarily hammering (or doing) creatures, but meaning-making and story-telling creatures. I assume Marty would agree (although he may not). My sense, however, is that the main task is not actually hammering, but meaning-making. Now, in my Enlightenment-steeped understanding of things, meaning-making takes places by means of accounts that (typically) utilize language. So, four questions.

1) Does meaning-making require language (put another way: Do all accounts utilize language?)?

2) Does meaning-making by way of language necessitate detachment (you may have addressed this in your discussion of Marty and Hans on language, but that was way over my head)?

3) Related, if meaning-making is the primary and unavoidable task of humans and if meaning-making happens by way of language (which I am not at all committed to), then doesn’t our “default” way of being in the world (or being-in-the-world) necessitate some sort of detachment?

4) Is Marty saying that becoming involved in hammering when encountering a hammer a type of account that doesn’t rely on language or detachment, but is nonetheless meaning-making by way of interacting with objects (and, implicitly, the degree of articulacy is related to the competency with which the hammer is used in hammering)?

 
At 8:37 am, Blogger JMC said...

This sentence: “My sense, however, is that the main task is not actually hammering, but meaning-making.”

Should read: “My sense, however, is that the main task of human interaction with a hammer is not actually hammering, but meaning-making.”

 
At 9:22 am, Blogger Hans-Georg Gadamer said...

J. Morgs - thanks for the questions. They are really good ones and you tend to clarify the arguments better than I do. Here are some first thoughts, I guess, but not answers:

Meaning-making: yes, I have never heard Marty use the phrase, but I am sure he would like it. He does make it quite clear that Dasein's job is to make sense of things, or to bring meaning to the world, in the sense that if Dasein did not exist than meaning would be incoherent. So I think he would me fine with meaning-making.

I think the trick again is that it is not a conscious meaning-making for H/G (Heidegger through Gadamer), but rather a world meaning-making. Meaning is made through language, but we do not speak it, we are thrown into language and it speaks us. I love the quote from Rilke that Gadamer opens his T&M with, I think it really helps understand his discussion:

"Catch only what you've thrown yourself, all is mere skill and little gain; but when you're suddenly the catcher of a ball thrown by an eternal partner with accurate and measured swing towards you, to your center, in an arch from the great bridgebuilding of God: why catching then becomes a power - not yours, a world's."

Unbelievable. And who said poetry can't speak reality better than propositions?

What H/G is getting at is that this eternal partner we are playing catch with is language (as Christians we might think of the Divine Word at this point, with illusion to God speaking creation into being and Jesus healing with a word, etc.) and it is not something we harness or use, rather it is the eternal partner which speaks us.

H/G also do not think that anything meaningful occurs outside of language, we are always thrown into language and everything is language in that sense; so there can be no non-linguistic meaningful statements (it is impossible to even think of something without language; does this highlight the use of the term "writing" for what monks do when they create icons?).

As far as detachment goes, we can never ultimately detach from the world in the objective sense, so meaning is always made in levels of attachment. I think the trouble with Anglo-American use of language is that it seems to require "detachment" for use. H/G disagree and say that language is always "working" in the sense that it is presenting and revealing the world through us. So where A-A tradition talks of consciousness, unconsciousness, subconsciousness; H/G (as well as Sartre - he rejects the notion of "consciousness", hence the Nothingness in his title) deem these inappropriate terms since they demand some subject/object distinction (coming to the ultimate form in Husserl's transcendental reflection and "bracketting" out the world). Instead of these we have the different forms of existence of Dasein. It might sound semantic, but I think the differences are really important in terms of involvement and such.

Alright, I hope that makes some sense to your questions; if what I am saying goes over your head then I must be speaking jibberish because you are certainly have a stronger philosophical mind than I do (even if it votes for Dems)!

 
At 11:33 am, Blogger Hans-Georg Gadamer said...

Ha ha! I refered to your mind/soul as an it!

 
At 2:37 pm, Blogger Arturo Vasquez said...

Have you read the work of the Greek Orthodox theologian, Christos Yannaras? This sounds very similiar, in a very different cultural context of course. He too was influenced by Heidegger.

This is also an issue I have tackled on my own blog by discussing the Neoplatonic philosopher Iamblichus.

 
At 5:05 am, Blogger JMC said...

Hans, thanks for your clarification. I am completely satisfied now and, to the degree that I understand any of this, appreciate it.

If the conversation isn't dead yet (it has been two years or something since anyone last commented), I want to ask about the application, then, of all of this: old ladies in church on Sunday.

I fully accept your criticisms of confessionalism and I think your unpacking of Marty helps us with the old ladies in the Evangelical context.

What differences, however, are there between confessionalism in Evangelicalism and catechesis in orthodoxy?

St. Cyril, for instance, required catechumens to study for 2 years – several hours a day every day - before their baptism (he also performed daily exorcisms on them, so maybe he is just a nutcase, who knows). Then, he gave a series of lessons and lecture in light of their baptism (he didn’t think they could hear the really important stuff until they had been saved through baptism).

As far as I can tell, catechesis is central to Christian practice (and has been for at least 1800 years). So does that create any problems or require any nuance to address? In light of the tradition of rigorous catechesis, what do we make of the old ladies now? What does Marty have to say?

 
At 8:10 pm, Anonymous Anonymous said...

Food for thought. Interesting blog.

http://z6.invisionfree.com/denominations

 
At 12:22 pm, Blogger RJ said...

holy crap - I really missed the boat on this post.

Look at you, playing hard and fast!! So hard! So fast! So...um...er...yuck.

I guess I'd have to wonder what you mean when you ask, "what does it take to be a Christian?" "Being" a Christian is a very tough thing to nail down. On one hand, it's rather like "being an American" in that you're a citizen of a particular group of people. From another perspective, it's like "being a soccer player", where the identity is driven by a set of consistent practices and experiences. It might sometimes also be like "Being a scientist" in that it implies certain unique abilities and qualities in the person. Lastly, it also simultaneously serves as an identity, in that a person is sometimes a Christian if they call themselves a Christian.

So I guess I'd argue that the definition is hazy, and requires context to make sense. You're not a Christian just for doing Christian things, calling yourself a Christian, or thinking Christian thoughts; rather you're a Christian for some combination of all of these, and this ought to imply Christian action and a Christian view of reality (whatever those are) in the Christian. It seems to me that it's disagreement over which of these ways of "being a Christian" to express more than the others that has lead to some of our worst sectarian battles over the years.

In truth, they're probably all Christian, and the best Christians would be those who emphasize the right things at the right time with the right people in the right degree of balance to....do the right thing.....those would be the right Christians. I guess that doesn't help much.

 
At 4:34 am, Anonymous Anonymous said...

Well, since the continent does better philosophy poetically, here goes:

To understand the living whole
The start by driving out the soul;
They count the parts, and when all's done,
Alas! the spirit bond is gone.

Goethe, from Faust, pt1

It seems that he writes with a Heideggerian pen...

 
At 4:40 am, Anonymous Anonymous said...

Apologies "The" in the second line should be "They"...

 
At 2:12 pm, Blogger Justin Donathan said...

Wow. Great post, I'm going to link it. This is something I think Protestantism has really missed the boat on. Is this thinking influenced by Polanyi or Newbiggin? I've read a bit of Newbiggin and was thinking of taking up Polanyi's "Personal Knowledge," sometime soon.

 
At 4:17 pm, Blogger RevRoss said...

I happened to come across you wonderful blog.

My blog is http://revross.blogspot.com

I will enjoy reading your posts.

Ross Slaughter, Pastor.
United Presbyterian Church, Cuyahoga Falls, OH

 

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